Discussion paper

DP19760 The Taming of the Skew: Asymmetric Inflation Risk and Monetary Policy

We document that inflation risk in the U.S. varies significantly over time and is often asymmetric. To analyze the first-order macroeconomic effects of these asymmetric risks within a tractable framework, we construct the beliefs representation of a general equilibrium model with skewed distribution of markup shocks. Optimal policy requires shifting agents' expectations counter to the direction of inflation risks. We perform counterfactual analyses using a quantitative general equilibrium model to evaluate the implications of incorporating real-time estimates of the balance of inflation risks into monetary policy communications and decisions.

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Citation

De Polis, A, L Melosi and I Petrella (2024), ‘DP19760 The Taming of the Skew: Asymmetric Inflation Risk and Monetary Policy‘, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 19760. CEPR Press, Paris & London. http://cepr.org/publications/dp19760